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The First Amendment Behind Bars: Free Exercise Claims Under RFRA and RLUIPA
I.

Introduction

Throughout the 1980’s, prisoners enjoyed very little free exercise protection under Supreme
Court precedent. The Supreme Court’s decisions were highly deferential to prison administrators,
giving almost carte blanche control over regulation of the institution’s free exercise policies.
Congress responded by enacting statutes requiring greater protection be given to free exercise of
religion in prisons. This paper will track jurisprudence as it relates to those statutory schemes
aimed at expanding prisoner free exercise rights. More specifically, it will analyze prisoners’ rights
to free exercise under both federal statutes as it relates to the application of strict scrutiny standard
of review in cases involving grooming and religious objects regulations. The central question is
whether the application of strict scrutiny is actually beneficial toward prisoners bringing free
exercise claims under these federal statutes.
The two federal statutes at issue are the Religious Freedom Restoration Act1 (“RFRA”) and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 20002 (“RLUIPA”). After RFRA was
struck down as applied to the states under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
enacted RLUIPA which, like its predecessor, reviewed prison policies restricting free exercise
under the most searching standard of review, strict scrutiny. Although RLUIPA attempted to fix
the shortcomings of RFRA, it was not until the landmark decision in Holt v. Hobbs3 where
prisoners actually saw some relief. In Holt, the Court sent a clear signal that prison administrators
would no longer receive deference as to the validity of regulations restricting religious practice
and would be subject to a heavy burden of proof to show that religious accommodations could not

1

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et. seq.
42 U.S.C. §2000cc, et. seq.
3
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 353 (2015).
2

1

be made without endangering prison safety and security. This paper will discuss RFRA caselaw
and both pre-Holt and post-Holt RLUIPA caselaw involving prisoner free exercise claims in the
context of grooming and religious object regulations. An analysis of this caselaw will reveal that
after Holt, prisoners have much greater success in bringing free exercise claims under RLUIPA.
Prisoners are overwhelmingly more likely to succeed in cases involving grooming regulations as
opposed to religious object regulations, but overall prisoners have greater protection of religious
free exercise under these statutory schemes.
II.

Prisoner Rights
a. Constitutional: Shabazz and Progeny
While the desire to practice religion as an incarcerated individual in the United States is

widespread, prisoners historically enjoyed slim constitutional protection of religious exercise.4 In
the New Deal era, courts began to hear more constitutional claims against state prisons, but
continued to show little interest in challenges to prison policies implicating free exercise.5 Starting
in the 1960s, federal courts became more amenable to prisoner free exercise claims. In Cruz v.
Beto, the Court held that a prison had a duty to provide its Muslim prisoners with a “reasonable
opportunity” of pursing their faith.6 Prisoners enjoyed the highest level of First Amendment
protection in the decade following Cruz, but judicial support behind prisoners’ free exercise claims
disappeared in 1987 with the Court’s decision in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.7 In Shabazz, the
Court rejected not only strict scrutiny but any kind of heightened scrutiny when reviewing prisoner

4

Thomas P. O’Connor & Michael Perreyclear, Prison Religion in Action and Its Influence on Offender
Rehabilitation, 35 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 11, 28 (2002).
5
See Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952) (holding that “it is not the function of the [c]ourts to
superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those
who are illegally confined”)
6
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
7
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987).
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free exercise claims.8 The Court set forth a “reasonableness” standard, where the central question
was whether “the prison’s action in burdening religious exercise was reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.” Citing Turner v. Safley9, the Court laid down four factors to be
used when determining reasonableness: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest alleged and whether the connection
is not so attenuated as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational; (2) whether inmates retain
alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right; (3) the impact of accommodating the right
on other prisoners, guards, and prison resources; and (4) whether there are alternatives to the
regulation restricting exercise of religion that “fully accommodate the prisoner’s rights at de
minimis cost to valid penological interests.”10 Through the use of this new approach, the Court
made it clear that a high degree of deference was to be given to prison administrations.
In another step in the seemingly wrong direction for prisoners’ rights, the Court issued its
landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith.11 Prior decisions, Sherbert v. Verner12 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder,13 both outside of the prison context, had subjected all laws that substantially
burdened religious exercise to a strict scrutiny standard of review14, but the Court in Smith held
that this more exacting standard of review applied only to laws that were not generally applicable,
involved individualized exemptions and what the Smith Court called “hybrid rights.”15

8

Id.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). This case narrowly construed the due process rights of prisoners.
10
Id.
11
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
12
Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
13
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
14
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake…we
must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote…and the impediment to those objectives that
would flow from recognizing the claimed exception”); Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (“any incidental
burden on the free exercise…may be justified by a compelling state interest…).
15
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 (actions “involving not only the Free Exercise alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as the freedom of speech and of the press…or the right of
parents to direct the education of their children…”).
9
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b. Statutory: RFRA and RLUIPA
In response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith, Congress enacted RFRA in November
of 1993.16 RFRA attempted to overrule the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith and restore the true
compelling interest test from the Sherbert and Yoder line of jurisprudence.17 Substantively, RFRA
allowed a for substantial burden on free exercise only if the government could prove that the
burden was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling interest.18 In other words, RFRA established a strict scrutiny
standard of review for any law or regulation which substantially burdened religious exercise. In
fact, the legislative history of RFRA revealed clear legislative intent that courts apply strict
scrutiny to prisoner free exercise claims.19
Only four years after its passage, RFRA was struck down as applied to the states in City of
Boerne v. Flores.20 Sent back to the drawing board, Congress sought to draft legislation that would
withstand what the Boerne Court identified as constitutional deficiencies.21 This culminated in
2000 with the passage of RLUIPA.22 To avoid running into the same issues as RFRA, RLUIPA
was intended to narrowly address “those areas of law where the congressional record of religious

16

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et. seq.
See 42 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, 2000bb-1.
18
Id.
19
See S. REP. NO. 103-111, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899 (stating intent to restore "protection
afforded to prisoners to observe their religions” which was undermined by Shabazz decision). See also 139 CONG.
REC. S14,465 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Exposure to religion is the best hope we have
for rehabilitation of a prisoner. Most prisoners, like it or not, will eventually be returning to our communities.").
20
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (holding that RFRA exceeded Congress’ Section 5 rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment by defining rights rather than enforcing them).
21
Id.
22
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. This paper will not discuss RLUIPA as it relates to land use, that topic is outside of the scope
of this comment.
17
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discrimination and discretionary burden was the strongest: laws governing institutionalized
persons and land use laws.” 23 Section 3 of RLUIPA24 states as follows:
(A) GENERAL RULE: No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as
defined in section 2 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42
U.S.C. 1997) even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
unless the government demonstrates that the imposition of the burden on that
person:
1. Is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
2. Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
government interest
(B) SCOPE OF APPLICATION: This section applies in any case which:
1. The substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that
receives Federal financial assistance; or
2. The substantial burden affects, or removal of the substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several
states, or with Indian tribes.25
Thus, under RLUIPA if the prisoner succeeds in making a prima facie showing that his
religious exercise was substantially burdened, RLUIPA shifts the burden to the defendant prison
officials to demonstrate their decision satisfies strict scrutiny–that burdening free exercise is the
least restrictive means to furthering the state’s compelling interest.26
III.

Supreme Court Interpretations of the Statutes

Supreme Court interpretations of both RFRA and RLUIPA demonstrate a remarkable
protectiveness over free exercise. In decisions like Gonzales27, Hobby Lobby28 and Holt29, the
Court reads statutory strict scrutiny to be sweepingly protective of religious exercise. While the
mandate from the Court was clear, lower court decisions reflect confusion on the accurate

23

Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000:
A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 944 (2001).
24
42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a)-(b).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
28
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
29
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 353 (2015).
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application of these statutes. Confusion resulted from hesitancy to apply a potent strict scrutiny
standard of review given persistent pressure to defer to prison officials and perennial concerns
about prison safety and security, as well as questions as to the constitutionality of the statutes.
These concerns were laid to rest after careful Supreme Court attention in Cutter30, where RLUIPA
was ruled constitutional, and Holt, where the Court clearly explained the role of prison
administration in free exercise cases. With these decisive questions answered, lower court
treatment of free exercise claims has shifted in prisoners’ favor over the last five years.
a. RFRA
The Supreme Court read RFRA as vastly protective of religious free exercise. The first
signal of this protectiveness came in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal.31 There, customs inspectors intercepted a shipment of hoasca, a sacramental tea
containing dimethyltryptamine (“DMT”), an illegal hallucinogen.32 The shipment was traced to O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (“UDV”), a Christian Spiritist sect originating in
Brazil, with an American branch containing 130 members.33 It was the UDV’s religious practice
to receive the sacrament of Communion through hoasca.34 The UDV argued that the seizure of the
hoasca violated RFRA.35 In fending off attacks from the government which craftily argued for the
Court to apply a more watered-down version of strict scrutiny36, the Court reinforced the

30

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 425-426 (2006).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Although not within the prison-context of this paper, the Gonzales case has one of the most succinct analyses of
true strict scrutiny. Lower courts applying RFRA did not seem to follow the clear mandate set out in this case.
36
The government attempted to argue that placement of DMT on Schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances Act as
having a “high potential for abuse” by users “precludes any consideration of individualized exceptions such as that
sought by the UDV.” The government argued that a flat-out ban was the least restrictive means of furthering the
compelling government interest of public safety. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that the compelling
interest must be satisfied against application of the challenged law to the particular claimant whose sincere belief is
being religiously burdened” which was not satisfied here since the Court must “look beyond broadly formulated
31
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proposition that “Congress’ express decision to legislate the compelling interest test indicates that
RFRA challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally mandated
applications of the test…” which requires the Court to “look beyond the broadly formulated
interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinize the asserted
harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.”37
The second relevant interpretation of RFRA which called for a true strict scrutiny test was
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores.38 At issue in this case was an HHS regulation that demanded
corporations to provide coverage for methods of contraception which violated the religious beliefs
of the owners.39 The Court began its discussion by reinforcing the idea that “the least restrictive
means standard is exceptionally demanding.”40 What makes this case broadly protective of free
exercise is the Court’s delineation of alternatives which would have been “certainly less restrictive
of the plaintiff’s religious liberties.”41 The fact that the Court illustrated a list of alternatives to the
religiously burdensome policy at issue signals sweeping protection of free exercise.
b. RLUIPA
RLUIPA was intended to be similarly protective of religious exercise. As a threshold
matter, RLUIPA does not define “compelling government interest” or “least restrictive means,”
but these terms have garnered an established meaning in constitutional jurisprudence.42 The Court

interests” and there was no indication that Congress, in classifying DMT, considered the harms posed by the
particular use at issue, sacramental use of hoasca by the UDV. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430-433.
37
Id.
38
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
39
Id. at 689-90.
40
Id. at 728.
41
Id. The court notes that “the most straightforward” way of achieving the government’s goal would be for the
government to assume the cost of providing the contraceptives to any women unable to obtain them under their
health insurance policies due to religious objections of their employer. The court noted a second option was the
creation of an entirely new government program to achieve the same goals.
42
Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA At Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’S Prisoner
Provisions, 28 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 501 (2005). See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice
must advance interests of the highest order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests”).
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has reinforced just how searching of an inquiry this is. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court stated that
compelling interests must be interests of only the “highest order.”43 In Sherbert v. Verner, the
Court stated that “only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation.”44 The Court has further emphasized this point by adding that where strict
scrutiny applies and the government must set forth a true compelling interest, the test “is not
watered…down” and that it “…really means what it says.”45
In terms of narrow tailoring, the Court has noted that a “searching inquiry” is required
where the onus is on the government to prove that “no alternative forms” of regulation could serve
the asserted interest without infringing on the protected right.46 The regulation should be struck
down under strict scrutiny where the government’s compelling interest could be achieved by
“narrower ordinances that burden religion to a far lesser degree.”47 In other words, if there is but
one other reasonable alternative with a lesser degree of intrusiveness on free exercise, the
challenged regulation cannot stand.
Predictably, the constitutionality of RLUIPA was also challenged. This challenge came in
2005 in Cutter v. Wilkinson, where Ohio prisoners sued under RLUIPA alleging free exercise
violations of non-mainstream religions due to denial of access to literature, group worship, and
other ceremonial items.48 RLUIPA was challenged as unconstitutional on the grounds that the
statute “improperly advances religion in violation of the…Establishment Clause.”49 The case rose
to the Supreme Court after the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion condemning RLUIPA.50 The

43

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 205, 215 (1972).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 407.
47
Id.
48
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).
49
Id.
50
Id.
44
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Supreme Court reversed, citing prior decisions where the Court held that the “government
may…accommodate religious practices…without violating the Establishment Clause” given
“room for play in the joints” between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the
government to accommodate religion beyond Free Exercise requirements without offending the
Establishment Clause.51
While the holding of Cutter was a step in the right direction for prisoners, the Court alluded
to a proposition which had previously led to apprehensive treatment by lower courts applying
RFRA. After affirming RLUIPA’s constitutionality, the court doubled back by saying, “we do not
read RLUIPA to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to
maintain order and safety…an accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other
significant interests.”52 The Court added that, “[w]hile the Act adopts a ‘compelling governmental
interest’ standard, ‘context matters’ in the application of that standard.”53 The Court cited support
from lawmakers dating back to RFRA’s passage that “courts would apply the Act’s standard with
“due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing
necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline consistent
with consideration of costs and limited resources.”54 As will be seen in the following section, this
dictum proved damaging to prisoner’s free exercise claims under RFRA and set the stage for the
same quasi-strict scrutiny review during the beginning stages of RLUIPA.
c. Holt v. Hobbs
The Holt v. Hobbs decision was nothing short of instrumental for prisoner’s free exercise
rights under RLUIPA. In Holt, a Muslim inmate challenged an Arkansas Department of

51

Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 722.
53
Id. at 723.
54
Id. at 723. See 139 Cong. Rec. 26190 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); S. Rep. No. 103-111 at 10.
52

9

Corrections grooming policy which prohibited inmates from growing beards.55 The policy had no
religious exemptions, but did contain an exemption for inmates with a diagnosed dermatological
condition who were permitted to wear facial hair no longer than one-quarter of an inch.56 The
petitioner sought permission to grow a beard that was one-half inch long but was denied, and
subsequently brought suit in district court under RLUIPA.57 The Magistrate Judge opined that
“prison officials are entitled to deference” and that “the grooming policy allowed petitioner to
exercise his religion in other ways, such as by praying on a prayer rug, maintaining the diet
required by his faith, and observing religious holidays” and recommended that the preliminary
injunction against the policy be vacated.58 The district court adopted the recommendation in full
and it was subsequently affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.59 The Supreme Court reversed, and in doing
so, finally gave inmates the momentum they needed in order to succeed on RLUIPA claims.
This decision changed the course of prisoner’s free exercise claims under RLUIPA for two
main reasons. First, the Holt Court makes it clear they are applying strict scrutiny, as opposed to
the quasi-strict scrutiny which lower courts had long been applying dating back to RFRA. In Holt,
the Court refused to accept the argument that the DOC’s compelling interest in safety and security
of the prison would be compromised by allowing an inmate to grow a beard that is one-half inch
in size, calling it an argument that is “hard to take seriously.”60 Secondly, and most importantly,
the Court firmly addressed the dicta set out ten years earlier in Cutter:
The magistrate Judge, the District Court and the Court of Appeals all thought
that they were bound to defer to the Department’s assertion that allowing
petitioner to grow such a beard would undermine its interest in suppressing
contraband. RLUIPA, however, does not permit such unquestioning deference.
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 353, 356 (2015).
Id.
57
Id. at 359.
58
Id. at 360.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 363.
55
56
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RLUIPA, like RFRA, “makes clear that it is the obligation of the courts to
consider whether exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress.”
That test requires the Department not merely to explain why it denied the
exemption but to prove that denying the exemption is the least restrictive means
of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Prison official are experts in
running prisons and evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, and
courts should respect that expertise. But that respect does not justify the
abdication of the responsibility, conferred by Congress, to apply RLUIPA’s
rigorous standard. And without a degree of deference that is tantamount to
unquestioning acceptance, it is hard to swallow the argument that denying
petitioner a one-half inch beard actually furthers the Department’s interest in
rooting out contraband.61
Importantly, the Holt decision is not isolated, but rather is built on precedent from Gonzales62
and Hobby Lobby63. The idea of statutorily mandated strict scrutiny had always been a concept
continuously reinforced by the Court and was only further intensified in Holt by the Court’s signal
that blind deference to prison administrators is not the correct way to apply RLUIPA.64
IV.

Lower Court Case Law on Grooming and Religious Objects Under Statutes

While the Supreme Court has, in Gonzales, Hobby Lobby, and again in Holt, made clear that
claims brought under RFRA and RLUIPA which state a prima facie case are to be reviewed under
strict scrutiny, what was actually applied by lower courts was nothing of the sort.
a. RFRA
While hindsight is 20/20, it is clear that RFRA failed to live up to its potential to improve
prisoners’ free exercise rights. Lower courts applied RFRA in such a way that 90% of all prisoner
claims filed under RFRA did not succeed.65 It is important to note that a large majority of
unsuccessful RFRA claims failed at the outset because the burden on religious exercise was not

61

Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
63
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
64
Holt, 574 U.S. at 364.
62

65

Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 607-17 (1998).
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found to be a substantial.66 In other words, the claimants failed in making out a prima facie showing
under RFRA.67 However, out of the cases which did succeed at the outset, most ultimately still
failed in the application of strict scrutiny.
There are two main factors attributable to RFRA’s harsh application to prisoner free
exercise claims. First, uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of RFRA was present since
shortly after its enactment.68 This led lower courts to approach RFRA cases apprehensively as an
initial matter. Second, many courts approached RFRA cases with legislative intent that due
deference still be provided to prison officials.69 Lower courts also did not have guidance from
decisions like Gonzales or Hobby Lobby, which were not only aggressively protective of free
exercise but also called for a very specific look at the possible problems caused by an exemption
and the possible alternatives.70 The product of these factors was a quasi-strict scrutiny analysis
applied to prisoner’s RFRA claims under which the institution almost always prevailed.
Almost all RFRA claims surviving past the substantial burden stage were subject to this
quasi-strict scrutiny. The first example of this came in Arguello v. Duckworth.71 There, the Seventh

66

Id.
This paper analyzes free exercise claims under RFRA and RLUIPA only as it relates to the application of strict
scrutiny standard of review, so an analysis of why these cases failed under the prima facie showing of a substantial
burden on religious exercise is outside the scope of this paper. See Haff v. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Wis.
1996) (seizure of inmate’s white supremacist books was not a substantial burden); Lemay v. Dubois, No. CIV. A.
95-11912-PBS, 1996 WL 463680 (D. Mass. July 29, 1996) (preventing inmate from accessing spiritual medallion,
feathers, sage, and cedar was not a substantial burden); Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1997) (preventing access
to Protestant books was not a substantial burden); Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1997) (ban on length of hair
and possession of sacred materials was not a substantial burden); Bruton v. McGinnis, 110 F.3d 63 (10th Cir. 1997)
(denial of access to Christian objects was not a substantial burden).
68
Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 Tex. L.
Rev. 247, 296 (1994) (positing that RFRA would be found to be unconstitutional under Section Five of the
Fourteenth amendment only one year after the statute was passed).
69
139 Cong. Rec. 26190 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); S. Rep. No. 103-111 at 10.
70
See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430-433 (“the compelling interest must be satisfied against application of the
challenged law to the particular claimant whose sincere belief is being religiously burdened” which was not satisfied
here since the Court must “look beyond broadly formulated interests” and there was no indication that Congress, in
classifying DMT, considered the harms posed by the particular use at issue”). See also Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at
728 (listing alternatives “certainly” less restrictive on plaintiff’s religious exercise).
71
Arguello v. Duckworth, No. 95-1222, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 445 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 1997).
67
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Circuit upheld a prison’s flat ban on Native American sacred herbs.72 The court accepted the at
face-value assertion that the flat ban was the least restrictive way to prevent contraband from
entering the prison, without exploring if other alternatives were actually less restrictive.73 The
court’s inquiry ended shortly after it began when the court said, “there is no evidence in the record
before us that Duckworth has not utilized the least restrictive means available to further these
compelling interests.”

74

The court failed to distinguish between lack of evidence and less

restrictive alternatives by failing to require the prison to actually explore ways to further their
compelling interests with less burdensome restrictions.
In George v. Sullivan, the court failed to analyze whether a flat ban on religious reading
was in fact the least restrictive means to furthering prison safety,75 and in Reimann v. Murphy, the
court even denied the offered alternative of redacting parts of the religious literature as opposed to
a flat ban because it would leave nothing more than “sentence fragments.”76 In Harris v. Chapman,
the court held that an ambiguously drawn prison regulation prohibiting prisoners from having
longer than “medium length” hair was the least restrictive means of furthering prison security,
without even defining what length constituted “medium length” and thus not considering if any
lesser restrictive alternatives could have achieved that same goal.77
Even with a more defined hair regulation of three inches, a prisoner was still denied an
exemption in Davie v. Wingard when the court stated that the legislative history behind RFRA
“shows that Congress intended for Courts to defer to the judgment of prison officials in matters of
security and discipline.”78 The court even went on to say that “it could be argued that Defendants
72

Id. at *2.
Id. at *8.
74
Id.
75
George v. Sullivan, 896 F. Supp. 895, 898 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
76
Reimann v. Murphy, 897 F. Supp. 398, 403 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
77
Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1996).
78
Davie v. Wingard, 958 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (S.D. Ohio. 1997).
73
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could serve these goals my maintaining a policy which prohibits long hair but provides exemptions
for religious genuine religious beliefs…” but afforded so much deference to the prison official’s
argument that the flat ban was the least restrictive means because exemptions would “greatly
complicate” the jobs of the corrections officers, and upheld the restriction anyway.79 In Rust v.
Clarke, the court once again found that “haircutting” generally was the least restrictive means of
furthering prison security, without investigating any alternative way to further such interest and
dismissing alternatives as “impractical.”80
Finally, In Hamilton v. Schriro, the court did not even apply strict scrutiny at all, stating
that “we find the ‘no greater than necessary’ requirement to be functionally synonymous with the
‘least restrictive means’ prong of the RFRA text when applied in the prison context.”81 It is notable
that courts hearing RFRA cases cited the legislative history82 rather than the actual text of the
statute when applying the compelling interest and least restrictive means standards. With the
opportunity to rely on legislative intent as opposed to the plain meaning of the statute, courts were
able to use RFRA to water down strict scrutiny and apply a standard of review somewhere in the
middle, without inquiry into whether the restrictive policies could actually be adjusted in a way to
allow prisoner free exercise as well as safety and security inside prison walls, producing acrossthe-board unconquerable obstacles for prisoners.

79

Id. at 1251.
Rust v. Clarke, 89 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 1996).
81
Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d. 1545, 1554 (8th Cir. 1996).
82
Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting S.Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11, reprinted
in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900). The Senate report reflects the following notion: “the committee expects that
courts will continue the tradition of giving due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security, and discipline
consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” See also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593
(1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Madison v. Ritter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 578 n.10 (W.D. Va. 2003), overruled on
other grounds 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Some courts, in examining prison regulations under RFRA and
RLUIPA, have softened the compelling interest test to allow speculative administrative judgments concerning
security and cost to suffice to allow the regulation to survive strict scrutiny . . . It is also an approach that is
dangerous for the protection of the constitutional rights of individuals outside of prison. Watering down strict
scrutiny in a result-oriented manner in the prison context could subvert its rigor in other fields where it is applied”).
80
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b. RLUIPA Pre-Holt
Following RLUIPA’s passage, courts faced many of the same application problems that
existed under RFRA. Pre-Holt decisions still reflected reliance on Cutter’s dictum and what many
courts viewed as a limited decision-making role so as not to substitute the court’s judgment over
that of prison officials. As a result, the majority of prisoner RLUIPA claims, although analyzed
under “strict scrutiny,” still failed as a result of the same issues as RFRA cases.
i. Grooming restrictions
While challenges to grooming regulations had more success as opposed to object
regulations, pre-Holt challenges in this area still experienced the same issues as RFRA era cases.
In Ickstadt v. Dretke, a Texas appellate court accepted the prison’s argument that a flat out “nobeard” policy was the least restrictive means to further the prison’s interest in safety and security
by lessening any risk of hidden contraband hidden in the beards.83 The court accepted this position
even though prisoners with medical conditions were allowed to grow beards.84 Allowing prisoners
to maintain beards for medical reasons but not for religious ones completely undermined the
prison’s argument for a compelling interest, but by granting such deference to the prison wardens,
the court nonetheless ruled in the institution’s favor.
Another example of watered-down strict scrutiny came in Limbaugh v. Thompson, where
an Alabama district court held that a Native American prisoner’s challenge to hair length
regulations could not succeed.85 The district court similarly applied a modified strict scrutiny test
which only required a showing that the defendant-prison “articulated legitimate reasons-based on

83

Ickstadt v. Dretke, No. H-02 1064, slip op. at 20 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2004).
Id.
85
Limbaugh v. Thompson, No. 93-D-1404-N, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2003).
84

15

compelling interest in prison safety and security” rather than asking the defendants to show that
the regulation was the least restrictive means to further a compelling government interest.86
In Longoria v. Dretke, a Native American prisoner challenged a grooming policy requiring
prisoners to maintain short hair.87 The Fifth Circuit, relying on a RFRA case in the same
jurisdiction88 involving a similar restriction, found that longer hair “facilitates” the transfer of
contraband and weapons and that requiring “prisoners to have short hair” makes it more difficult
for escaped prisoners to alter their appearance.89 Like many of the RFRA cases in this area, the
Fifth Circuit did not even attempt to explore less restrictive alternatives like allowing prisoners to
maintain longer hair at a certain length.90 Once again, the court drew on notions of deference even
before RLUIPA’s enactment, saying, “in enacting RFRA, Congress intended to continue to extend
substantial deference to prison officials in legitimate security matters.”91 It is telling that courts,
even in the age of RLUIPA, still refer back to and cite RFRA cases and legislative intent behind
the enactment of RFRA to decide RLUIPA matters.92 This demonstrates that the deference given
to prison officials neared blind acceptance, which set in motion the same events seen in RFRA
cases: deference, a failure to apply true strict scrutiny, and prisoner defeat.
In Smith v. Ozmint, a South Carolina district court upheld a one-inch hair length policy
with no religious exemptions premised on maintaining prison safety and security.93 The court
determined that the plaintiff-prisoner would not succeed on the merits of his RLUIPA claim and
denied a preliminary injunction finding that “the court must defer to the prison official’s testimony
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that the old policy has become cumbersome and impossible.”94 This grant of deference to prison
officials came just a paragraph after the court opined that, “…it is far from clear that the SCDC
Policy will be found to be the least restrictive means available.” Even in light of this, the court
continued, “[n]onetheless, the court agrees with the magistrate that Plaintiff does make the
showing of a likelihood of success necessary to justify a preliminary injunction…”95
In Johnson v. McCann, an Illinois district court upheld a grooming policy which “prohibits
hairstyles, including facial hair, which present a…security risk.”96 The court held that this policy
satisfied the least restrictive alternative test, because the plaintiff himself did not provide any
alternatives.97 However, the court provided its own alternative, stating that “regular individual
inspections of inmates with long hair would prove a less restrictive means of maintaining prison
safety…” but upholding the policy because “it would not adequately address the legitimate safety
concerns of prison officials.”98 Here, we see the court offering its own less restrictive alternative
and still upholding the restriction not based on the prison’s actual exploration of such alternatives,
but solely on testimony from prison officials. Districts including Pennsylvania99, Virginia100, West
Virginia101, South Carolina102, and Georgia103 and various Circuit courts including the Fourth104,
Sixth105, Eighth106 and Eleventh107 have identical holdings.
ii. Religious objects restrictions
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In the context of regulations which restricted use of religious objects, plaintiffs encountered
much of the same difficulty in providing proof strong enough to overcome the deference given to
prison administrators. We see the courts getting quite crafty in side-stepping application of true
strict scrutiny review, instead focusing on technicalities in the facts of the cases and playing up
safety and security concerns of prisons.
In Davis v. Abercrombie, the plaintiff’s prayer object108 was confiscated for security
purposes.109 The plaintiff argued that the prison could have used less burdensome alternatives as
opposed to a confiscation, such as placing the object in the chaplain’s custody or keeping it in a
clear Ziploc bag, preventing concealment and allowing prison officials to inspect the item without
touching it.110 Even after the Hawaii district court cited precedent from RLUIPA stating that prison
administrators must “show that they actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive
measures before adopting the challenged practice,”111 such evidence is nowhere to be found in the
opinion. Instead, when determining if the prison used the least restrictive means, the court pointed
to the plaintiff’s failure to list his prayer object on a required Inventory Form, and testimony from
prison officials that confiscating the religious object was their only option.112 The court inquired
into why the prison officials took the action they did but not whether that action was the least
restrictive means of preserving prison safety. By relying so heavily on the testimony from prison
officials, the court failed to apply the second prong of strict scrutiny with the bite mandated by
RLUIPA. District courts of Virginia, Texas and Alabama have applied the same analysis.113
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In Fowler v. Crawford114, a Native American inmate filed a RLUIPA claim after being
denied the items needed to make a sweat lodge.115 The plaintiff relied on the correctional facility’s
history of successfully operating a sweat lodge for over a decade without incident, and argued that
in light of this, a flat ban was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s security
interests.116 The defendants argued that they had met their burden in exploring alternatives by
offering the plaintiff an outdoor area to “smoke a ceremonial pipe” and practice “other aspects of
his Native American faith.”117 The plaintiff rejected these options, arguing that nothing short of a
sweat lodge would allow him to properly practice his religion.118 When evaluating whether a less
restrictive alternative existed, the court relied on the Plaintiff’s rejection to “practice” his religion
using “other aspects” instead of whether lesser restrictive alternatives existed to a flat out ban on
the sweat lodge itself.119 The court also cited Cutter, claiming that “Cutter counsels restraint in this
realm…to provide due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators.”120 Once again, the Eighth Circuit and others121 replace deference with blind
loyalty to prison officials and in doing so, misapply the second prong of strict scrutiny.
c. RLUIPA Post-Holt
The Holt decision marked a turning point in prisoner free exercise jurisprudence. By 2015,
prisoners began to experience more success in free exercise claims. As will be further discussed,
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this is attributable to the Holt Court “setting the record straight” that courts are not to apply blind
acceptance to unsubstantiated assertions by prison officials as to the viability of less restrictive
alternatives. With this clarity, lower courts were no longer able to take prison officials at their
word and began holding the institutions accountable for failure to explore possible alternatives.
i. Grooming
Prisoners experienced the greatest level of success in post-Holt RLUIPA challenges to
grooming restrictions. A prime example of the Holt mandate at play came in Ware v. La. Dep’t of
Corrections, where a Rastafari prisoner challenged a Louisiana state prison restriction prohibiting
prisoners from wearing dreadlocks.122 Citing Holt, the Fifth Circuit stated that “the least restrictive
means standard is exceptionally demanding, and it requires the government to show that it lacks
other means of achieving its desired goal other than the challenged policy.”123 On the issue of
deference, the Fifth Circuit continued, “in the face of contrary policies, we may not defer to prison
officials ‘mere say-so’ that they could not accommodate the plaintiff’s request because other
policies indicate a less restrictive means may be available.”124 Against a backdrop drastically
different than RFRA and RLUIPA policies which cited only the legislative history behind the
statutes, the court rejected the prison’s argument that budget and staffing cuts prevented the prison
from performing hair inspections.125 The prison provided the same assertions regarding safety and
security that had long passed muster in the pre-Holt era, but the court rejected these claims,
reasoning that given evidence that the majority of jurisdictions have a more lenient policy on the
issue, the prison was required to “offer persuasive reasons for the disparity” which it failed to do,
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and as such it failed to show that the grooming policies were the least restrictive means.126 Many
other district courts including Georgia127, Florida128, Arizona129, New Jersey130, Louisiana131,
Illinois132, and Kentucky133 have issued opinions with the same reasoning, all resulting in a
prisoner victory against the challenged grooming policy.
In Casey v. Davis, a Texas district court similarly upheld a challenge to a grooming policy
prohibiting the plaintiff from wearing a kouplock134 and smoking a prayer pipe while wearing a
religiously significant “medicine bag.”135 When applying strict scrutiny, the court emphasized that
deference owed to prison officials “is not unlimited…and policies grounded on mere speculation,
exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to meet the Act’s requirements.”136
The court acknowledged that in a pre-Holt era both the grooming religious object policies could
prove to be the least restrictive means, but following Holt, courts must analyze the policy in light
of the individual circumstances of the claimant.137 The court considered the plaintiff’s status as a
low security risk inmate, and the fact that the prison had not affirmatively demonstrated that a total
ban on the ability to wear a kouplock and use the prayer pipe and medicine bag was the least
restrictive way to maintain security.138 The court in Cobb v. Morris issued an opinion with the
same reasoning one year later.139
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In Ali v. Stephens, a Muslim prisoner challenged a grooming policy which prevented him from
growing a beard not shorter than fist length, as required by his faith.140 In Ali, we actually see the
court resolve a contested issue of fact in the prisoner’s favor, instead of the prison. Testimony
regarding whether or not performing searches of beard hair was feasible such that prisoners could
grow longer beards without posing greater security risk was a contested issue.141 The Fifth Circuit
found that beard hair could be searched the same way as head hair, despite testimony to the
contrary from the prison Warden.142 The court expressed that, “although we must respect a prison
official’s expertise, the trial court in this case did not exceed its prerogative as a fact finder in
resolving competing testimony in Ali’s favor where, as here, its finding was supported by
testimony from both Ali’s experts and [the prison’s] own witness.143 Another important holding
came in rejecting the prison’s cost control argument. The prison argued a flat ban was the least
restrictive means of maintaining security because the extra time and money spent to search each
Muslim inmate’s beard would be untenable.144 In a pre-Holt type of case, a court would typically
accept this at face-value. Here, the court not only rejected the argument but did its own independent
calculation of the exact amount that the prison could reasonably be expected to pay for the extra
maintenance.145 The court noted that, the trial court was not “bound to accept TDCJ’s predictions
in light of the speculative nature of the testimony of [] the witnesses.”146 A New Hampshire district
court used the same reasoning to invalidate a grooming policy limiting beard lengths to one-quarter
of an inch, finding the policy not to be the least restrictive means because the warden had not
investigated how facilities without beard restrictions managed risks associated with longer
140
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beards.147 This kind of analysis from the court is markedly different than what one would have
seen in a pre-Holt era, especially given that any kind of language signaling legislative intent to
give deference to prison officials was not included in either opinion.
ii. Objects
The Holt decision did help RLUIPA challenges to regulations involving access to religious
objects, but these claims are generally less successful even in a post-Holt era given that objects of
any kind are inherently more dangerous to prison security and susceptible to abuse than restrictions
concerning hair length. Especially with safety and security concerns including contraband
smuggling, hidden weapons and illegal use, prisoners arguing for access to objects to be used in
connection with religious services still face the uphill battle of legitimate security concerns. While
the Holt court alluded to the idea of smuggling contraband in a one-half inch beard as laughable148,
the same can’t necessarily be said to objects which prisoners have access to with limited to no
supervision. That being said, the lack of blind acceptance to assertions from prison officials still
allowed some claims in this area to succeed which would have previously been unsuccessful.
A prime example is Greenhill v. Clarke, where the Fourth Circuit held that a prison
restricting an inmate’s use of a television to participate in Jum’ah services to incentivize inmate
participation in a program designed to improve behavior in confinement did not satisfy strict
scrutiny.149 The court reasoned that “to be valid… [the prison] must address specifically why the
denial of limited television access…is necessary to maintain order, security, discipline or to control
costs.” In an identical television case, a Georgia district court used the same reasoning.150 Similarly
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in LaPlante v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., a Massachusetts district court invalidated a prison’s ban on
access to sacred herbs and teas, finding that the flat ban “require[d] more deference to the
Defendants than is due to rule that their broad assertions carry the burden of proving that their flat
denial of the…teas is the least restrictive means.”151 These courts used Holt to hold the institution
to its burden of proof—something a pre-Holt court would likely not have done.
Courts have also used Holt to allow prisoner access to religious objects in supervised
situations. In Cox v. Stephens, Native American prisoners were allowed use of medicine bags in
cell areas and to and from religious services.152 In Anderson v. Dzurenda inmates were allowed to
purchase religious objects for supervised use in their cells from a source selected by the prison.153
The same was true for a prisoner wanting to possess an Islamic fezz while in his cell154, a kufi both
inside and outside of the cell155 and even use of a kufi inside the cell as well as in the exercise
yard156, as a flat ban on the use these objects in any of these areas was not proven to be the least
restrictive means of quelling violence or improving safety and security by the prisons in any of
these cases. These courts were able to use Holt to allow prisoners access to their sacred religious
objects by removing the possibility of taking prison officials’ word as gospel on overly
burdensome restrictions. By actually exploring the possibility of alternatives, inmates were
actually able to see relief in this area.
V.

Analysis of Cases In Part IV
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Of course, RLUIPA claims are not impenetrable and some courts157 do remain legitimately
concerned about the safety and security of American prisons. However, an analysis of RFRA cases
and both pre-Holt and post-Holt RLUIPA cases clearly demonstrates that the Court’s decision in
Holt breathed life into prisoner free exercise claims. After the Supreme Court’s clear mandate in
Holt that courts were not to place great deference onto the testimony of prison wardens and
officials, but rather must hold the institutions to their burden in evaluating the possibility of less
restrictive alternatives, prisoners were finally able to bring successful challenges to overly
burdensome prison regulations which restricted prisoners’ free exercise of religion.
After Holt, bare assertions of a prison’s safety or security risk are no longer sufficient to
withstand an RLUIPA attack. Testimony from a prison official that a proffered alternative would
be unduly burdensome or impractical no longer passes muster in a post-Holt line of reasoning, as
it was clear from Holt that prisons no longer receive unquestioned deference. In other words, all
courts after the Holt decision was issued must actually apply and analyze claims under rigid strict
scrutiny. As a result, post 2015, we see the court ruling in favor of prisoners where the institutional
defendant had not explored alternatives or did not proffer proof that the alternatives would not
further the institution’s goals. We even see some courts suggest their own less restrictive
alternatives when finding in favor of the prisoner.
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An analysis of the relevant caselaw also demonstrates that prisoners experience the greatest
amount of success in challenges to grooming regulations. While prisoners have experienced more
success in the context of challenges to regulations involving access to religious objects than under
RFRA and before Holt, this success is limited by the fact that objects are inherently more
dangerous than hair and beard regulations. It is no surprise that certain foreign objects, whether
associated with religious use or not, pose unique security risks and could be subject to abuse by
inmates. Put simply, Holt can only be stretched so far—some religious objects do realistically pose
safety and security threats, and this cannot be ignored no matter how little deference a court gives
to the opinion of prison officials. With the correct application of strict scrutiny, RLUIPA is now
working precisely how it should be—by restricting religious exercise when such restriction really
is the least burdensome way to achieve important state interests like keeping inmates and prison
officials safe. It is undoubtedly harder for a court to justify the use of scalding rocks and wood
beams for use in building a religious sweat lodge, when these items can so easily be used to incite
violence or cause injury. Even in light of this, after Holt courts are more likely to allow prisoner
access to objects for religious use under supervised conditions, or in limited areas of the prison. In
a pre-Holt era, a court would be far more likely to uphold a flat ban on use of objects. Famously
said, “prisoners do not abandon their constitutional rights at the prison door.”158 The Holt decision
has helped this ring true in the context of prisoner free exercise claims, and prisoners no longer
face an uphill battle to freely—and safely—practice and exercise their religious freedom inside
prison doors.
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